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国有企业的补贴政策，一方面要学会充分利用 WTO 规则。 
 





























Subsidies to China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) under the WTO 
framework are not only generally subject to the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement) which is the corn of WTO subsidy 
disciplines, but also particularly subject to the legal documents on the accession of 
China to WTO. This paper first analyzes the WTO rules with respect to subsidies to 
SOEs, and then, under the framework of these rules, try to discuss the domestic issues 
under the perspective of international law and discuss problems of subsidies to 
China’s SOEs together with the question of how to reasonably utilize WTO subsidy 
disciplines, with the purpose of presenting a guide for China. This paper includes four 
chapters besides the preface and conclusion. 
Chapter 1 introduces the general rules stipulate subsidies to SOEs under the 
WTO framework. First from their existing basis, then turns to special rules under the 
SCM Agreement about subsidies to SOEs, including the definition and exceptional 
rules to developing countries or transition economy states. 
Chapter 2 analyzes the types and nature of subsidies to China’s SOEs. There are 
mainly four types, including tax preference, policy-related subsidies to cover 
enterprise losses, preferential loans and funds for special purposes. Subsidies to SOEs 
may be specific and actionable which are subject to the SCM Agreement. They will 
cause potential trade effects to international trade. 
Chapter 3 discusses the special rules of China’s accession documents with 
respect to subsidies to SOEs. Take the interface theory as the jurisprudence basis of 
the special rules on subsidies to China’s SOEs. Then this paper provides an analysis of 
the special rules towards the issue of subsidies to SOEs, involving the specificity 
standard about subsidies to China’s SOEs, the non-market economy methodology for 
calculating subsidies, the exclusion of China from the privatization exception and the 
absence of any transitional period for China to phase out its subsidies to SOEs. These 
special rules have turned out to reflect a growing sentiment in the world fearing the 
impact of China’s rise as a new economic power. 













WTO 框架下中国国有企业补贴法律问题研究  
the governmental attitude and countermeasures to the problems of subsidies to 
China’s SOEs. Our government should not only clean up and adjust the subsidy 
policy to SOEs, but should also learn to make full use of WTO disciplines.  
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WTO 协定 Marraksh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
马拉喀什建立世界贸易组织协定 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  关税与贸易总协定 
SCM 协定 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  补贴与反
补贴措施协定 


























Table of Cases  案例表  
 
Table of Cases  案例表 
 




Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the 
Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, 2 August 1999 
 





Panel Report, United States-Countervailing Measures 
Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities，
WT/DS212/R, 31 July 2002; 
Appellate Body Report, United States-Countervailing 
Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European 




Panel Report, United States-Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, WT/DS257/R, 29 August 2003; 
Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Countervailing 
Duty Determination with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 





Panel Report, United States-Imposition of Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Hot-Roll Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel 
Products Originating in the United Kingdom，WT/DS138/R, 23 
December1999; 
Appellate Body Report, United States-Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Roll Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, 

























目   录  
 
目  录 
 
引  言 ····················································································································· 1 
第一章  WTO 框架下规范国有企业补贴的一般规则 ··························· 2 
第一节  WTO 补贴规则的存在基础 ····································································· 2 
一、市场经济···································································································· 2 
二、国际贸易的公平自由 ················································································ 3 
第二节  WTO 框架下规范国有企业补贴的一般规则 ·········································· 3 
一、GATT1994 关于国营贸易企业的规定 ····················································· 3 
二、《SCM 协定》中涉及国有企业补贴的具体规则······································ 4 
第二章  中国国有企业补贴的类型与性质 ················································ 9 
第一节  概述············································································································ 9 
第二节  中国国有企业补贴的类型 ······································································ 10 
一、税收优惠·································································································· 11 
二、政策性亏损补贴 ······················································································ 13 
三、优惠贷款·································································································· 13 
四、特殊基金·································································································· 14 
第三节  中国国有企业补贴的性质 ······································································ 14 
一、国有企业补贴可能构成“专项性补贴” ··················································· 15 
二、国有企业补贴可能构成“可诉性补贴” ··················································· 16 
三、潜在的贸易影响 ······················································································ 17 
第三章  中国入世文件中规范国有企业补贴的特色 
规则及评价 ······················································································· 19 
第一节  WTO 框架下“中国特色”规则的理论基础 ············································ 19 
一、“接合理论”的产生背景··········································································· 19 
二、“接合理论”的主要内容··········································································· 19 













WTO 框架下中国国有企业补贴法律问题研究  
一、《入世议定书》第 6 条 ············································································ 21 
二、《入世议定书》第 10 条 ·········································································· 21 
三、《入世议定书》第 15 条 ·········································································· 22 
四、《工作组报告》第 46 段 ·········································································· 23 
五、《工作组报告》第 171 段 ········································································ 24 
第三节  评价·········································································································· 24 
一、关于国有企业补贴的专项性标准··························································· 25 
二、计算中国补贴的非市场经济方法··························································· 28 
三、排除中国援引私有化的例外 ·································································· 30 
四、中国逐步取消对国有企业的补贴缺乏过渡期 ······································· 32 
五、小结·········································································································· 33 
第四章  WTO 框架下对中国国有企业补贴问题的对策思考 ··········· 35 




第二节  充分利用 WTO 规则 ·············································································· 38 
一、掌握和利用 WTO“游戏规则”································································· 38 
二、充分利用多哈回合修改现有规则··························································· 40 
三、充分利用 WTO 争端解决机制 ······························································· 42 

















Preface ···················································································································· 1 
Chapter 1  General Rules Stipulate Subsidies to SOEs  
under WTO Framework··························································· 2 
Subchapter 1  Foundation of WTO Subsidy Disciplines······································ 2 
Section 1  Market Economy ············································································· 2 
Section 2  Equity and Liberty of International Trade········································ 3 
Subchapter 2  General Rules Stipulate Subsidies to  
SOEs under WTO Framework······················································ 3 
Section 1  State Trading Enterprises Stipulated by GATT1994························· 3 
Section 2  Subsidies to SOEs Stipulated by the SCM Agreement····················· 4 
Chapter 2  Types and Nature of Subsidies to China’s SOEs··············· 9 
Subchapter 1  Summary ························································································ 9 
Subchapter 2  Types of Subsidies to China’s SOEs············································ 10 
Section 1  Tax Preference ··············································································· 11 
Section 2  Policy-Related Subsidies to Cover Enterprise Losses ···················· 13 
Section 3  Preferential Loans·········································································· 13 
Section 4  Funds for Special Purposes···························································· 14 
Subchapter 3  Nature of Subsidies to China’s SOEs ·········································· 14 
Section 1  Subsidies to SOEs may Be Specific··············································· 15 
Section 2  Subsidies to SOEs may Be Actionable··········································· 16 
Section 3  Potential Trade Effects··································································· 17 
Chapter 3  Special Rules of China’s Accession Documents  
Regulate Subsidies to SOEs and Evaluation ···················· 19 
Subchapter 1  Theoretical Basis of Rules with Chinese Characteristics ·········· 19 
Section 1  Background of the Interface Theory ·············································· 19 
Section 2  Contents of the Interface Theory···················································· 19 
Subchapter 2  Rules with Chinese Characteristics about Subsidies to SOEs··· 20 













WTO 框架下中国国有企业补贴法律问题研究  
Section 2  Article 10 of the China’s Accession Protocol································· 21 
Section 3  Article 15 of the China’s Accession Protocol································· 22 
Section 4  Paragraph 46 of the China’s Accession Working Party Report······· 23 
Section 5  Paragraph 171 of the China’s Accession Working Party Report····· 24 
Subchapter 3  Evaluation····················································································· 24 
Section 1  Specificity Standard about Subsidies to China’s SOEs ·················· 25 
Section 2  Non-Market Economy Methodology for Calculating Subsidies····· 28 
Section 3  Exclusion of China from the Privatization Exception ···················· 30 
Section 4  Absence of Transitional Period to Phase Out Subsidies to SOEs ··· 32 
Section 5  Conclusion····················································································· 33 
Chapter 4  Countermeasures to Subsidies to China’s  
SOEs under WTO Framework············································· 35 
Subchapter 1  Adjust the Policy of Subsidies to SOEs by the Government ····· 35 
Section 1  Deal with the Relationship between the Government and SOEs···· 36 
Section 2  Clean up and Regulate the Policy of Subsidies to SOEs ················ 36 
Section 3  Stick to the Reform of SOEs on the Commercial Basis ················· 38 
Subchapter 2  Make the Best of WTO Rules ······················································ 38 
Section 1  Master and Utilize WTO “Game Rules” ········································ 38 
Section 2  Utilize Doha Development Agenda to Amend the Existent Rules·· 40 
Section 3  Utilize the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism ·························· 42 
Conclusion ··········································································································· 44 














引   言  
 1
 





























Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
